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First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture:
Ascriptive Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO
Model of International Civil Society
Benedict Kingsbury*

The growing sense that there exists, or ought soon to exist, an international civil
society has begun to inspire among its participants and proponents a quest for a more
complete articulation of normative principles, perhaps even a kind of constitution, to
guide the future development of such a society and to build a sense of coherence and
solidarity among its adherents. In this short essay I will argue first that an
operational code resembling First Amendment liberalism has been the de facto guide
in the construction of international civil society, and second that this code encourages
voluntaristic non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") but is not well suited to the
circumstances of ascriptive groups exercising governmental powers.2 A richer
international constitutionalism will be needed in order satisfactorily to address
accountability, mandate, representation, and participation in relation to these groups.
In the absence of such a theorized constitutional structure for international civil
society, I argue that some modest progress on these questions may be made by
drawing upon an incipient internationalized public law of indigenous peoples issues.
I. THE RELEVANCE OF FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERALISM AND
INTERNATIONALIZED PUBLIC LAW

At present there exists neither formal agreement on express principles for the
construction and regulation of international civil society, nor a strong code of
unwritten quasi-constitutional principles among the leading participants. What then
Professor of Law, New York University Law School. The research assistance of Cinnamon

1.
2.

Gilbreath, discussions with David Golove, Kirsty Gover, and Karen Knop, and the support of the
Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund are all gratefully acknowledged.
See Richard Falk, Global Civil Society and the Democratic Prospect in Barry Holden, ed, Global
Democracy: Key Debates 162 (Roudedge 2000).
I use the term "ascriptive groups" loosely to mean groups in which membership is based more on
birth than volition. Many indigenous peoples organizations, but not all, are ascriptive groups that
exercise governmental powers.
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is the operational code guiding the developing practice of the most influential NGOs
(including NGOs connected with corporations), and of the governmental and intergovernmental agencies and institutions interacting with NGOs, as they take steps
directed towards realizing an international civil society and securing their own roles in
relation to it? Academic writers and public intellectuals have presented normative
arguments for a rich form of cosmopolitan democracy,3 the construction of a global
public space through discursive interaction,4 the development of a post-modern global
citizenship,' or an emancipatory international society that repudiates the existing
international "unsociety" of state representatives. 6 The realization of any of these
conceptions, if it is to occur at all, remains far in the future. The role of democratic
state sovereignty as a means to organize the collective agency of members of a shared
political project and public culture is a role not easily substituted by any set of global
institutions, so the displacement or reconstruction of state sovereignty envisaged in
some of these projects may for the foreseeable future entail costs that outweigh the
attainable benefits. Whether it is practicable to democratize global intergovernmental
institutions fully is also open to considerable doubt. It is mistaken to suppose that a
world with an influential international civil society will necessarily be more peaceful
than a world dominated by sovereign states.7 The functions and attributes of
sovereignty are nevertheless changing, intergovernmental institutions are becoming
more open, and an uneven but appreciable enlargement and democratization of the
global public space can perhaps be discerned.
Practice as to the roles and participation of non-state groups in international civil
society is rapidly evolving. I suggest that this evolution is guided not by one of the
aspirational normative theories just mentioned, but by a seldom articulated sense that
the architectural scheme for the further construction of such roles and participation is
provided by the global application of liberal principles akin to those associated in the
United States with the First Amendment." NGOs operating internationally are
attracted by the notion in US public law that anyone should be free to form a group,
to raise funds for it by any legal means, and to advocate through it virtually any
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

Daniele Archibugi and David Helds, eds, Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order
(Polity 1995).
See Jfirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (MIT 1996).
See Janna Thompson, Community Identity and World Citizenship in Daniele Archibugi, David Held,
and Martin K6hler, eds, Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Polity
1998).
See Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Orderfor a New World (Oxford 2d ed 2001).
See Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford 1999).
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
US Const Amend I.
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nonviolent political or moral position. Apart from some obligations with regard to
the use of funds, taxation, employment law, and occasional tort liability, US law
imposes little responsibility or accountability on participants in such groups beyond
whatever they undertake through the terms of their own agreements. It is plausible
that NGOs operating in this US environment seek to transpose to international civil
society, mutatis mutandis, the constraints on governmental regulation of the content of
any group's advocacy or beliefs, and the requirement that states respect freedom of
religion and maintain the public sphere as formally secular. This transposition is
made easier by the transnationalism already embraced in the First Amendment
protection of advocacy of positions that infringe the laws of another country or the
moral code of another community.9
NGOs are subject to, and familiar with, regulation under national public law in
the territories where they operate, even if they regard themselves primarily as
operating in a non-territorial international civil society that to some extent has its own
rules and practices. The construction of the rules and practices of international civil
society involves the simultaneous application of national public law and a set of
international or transnational rules, practices, and understandings. In so far as
national public law is relevant as applicable law or as a source of principles and ideas, I
suggest that there is emerging what I term an internationalized public law relating to
international civil society.'0 The extent to which the basic principles for participation
and responsibility of non-state actors in international civil society should be, or will
be, embodied in law rather than in other normative structures is contested. Whether
or not law should be directly involved, I suggest that the normative principles of First
Amendment-type liberalism are proving in practice to be a shared starting point
among a cluster of internationally influential NGOs that otherwise have diverging
substantive agendas and operating methods. These NGOs are mainly, but not
exclusively, based in North America and Europe, but the concerns among other
groups about Western dominance have not much affected the framing of this
architecture. Such a set of values may also be discerned, with variations and
qualifications, in the practice of many external institutions (governmental foreign aid
agencies, intergovernmental institutions such as the European Union, and major
funding NGOs such as the Ford Foundation and the Open Society Institute)
involved in fostering local civil society organizations with transnational connections. I
do not suggest that extrapolation from liberal First Amendment ideas is necessarily a
9.

Attempts by foreigners to influence US politics and political opinion are much more subject to
regulation, including restrictions on donations by foreigners to candidates for US political office,
requirements for certain recipients of foreign funds to register as foreign agents, and Cold War era
requirements that makers of certain foreign motion pictures inform viewers in the US that the work
is foreign propaganda.

10.

Benedict Kingsbury, People and Boundaries: An 'Internationalized Public Law' Approach, in Allen
Buchanan and Margaret Moore, eds, Boundaries: EthicalPerspectives (Cambridge forthcoming).
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conscious process, although for actors socialized in the US it may well be. Nor do I
assume that such ideas are drawn especially from the United States- with different
emphases they are found in many political traditions. I take the First Amendment as
an influential marker in denominating the kind of principles many participants
shaping the construction of international civil society accept and espouse.
II.

CONSEQUENCES OF FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY

The assertion that First Amendment liberalism is informing practice in the
construction of international civil society is only a hypothesis, not a proposition that
can be robustly demonstrated here. As a hypothesis to explain the self-understanding
of actors engaged in the construction of international civil society, it appears, at a
minimum, to be consistent with, and perhaps explanatory of, several observable
features of that practice. First, the struggle to articulate any useful approaches to
establishing rigorous accountability of non-state actors suggests that international civil
society has at present minimal conceptual resources other than First Amendment
liberalism for structuring thought about problems of accountability.
First
Amendment liberalism offers few means of NGO accountability except via markets,
and it tends to view demands for other forms of accountability with suspicion-as
devices used to muzzle free expression or to introduce content regulation. (However,
some large NGOs are enthusiastic about the protection of intellectual property,
particularly in their own merchandising or their joint operations with corporate
partners, apparently seeing no conflict between such restrictions and First
Amendment liberalism.) The lack of other ideas about accountability suggests not
only that First Amendment liberalism has been tacitly imported as the prevailing
blueprint for NGO participation in international civil society, but also that it almost
exhausts the field, so that few other principles of international constitutionalism
bearing on accountability have been developed or invoked.
Second, international civil society has no agreed principles for rationing
entitlements to participate in institutions where the total possibilities of participation
are inescapably constrained by the need to accomplish the institution's tasks." With

11.

See Mikmaq Tribal Society v Canada, UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986 at paras 5.4, 5.5, and 6
(Dec 3, 1991). The Human Rights Committee concluded in Mikmaq that the right to participation
in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not entitle even
directly affected groups to choose the modalities of their participation in deliberations affecting
them, although such participation could not be subject to unreasonable restriction. While advocates
for indigenous peoples have strongly criticized the Committee's view that the Mikmaq nation was
not entitled to direct participation in the Canadian First Ministers constitutional conferences
(representation of aboriginal peoples in these conferences having being confined to certain umbrella
groups), any general theory of participation must also rake account of the need for limits on
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thousands of groups clamoring to participate in decisions on a given issue, and finite
resources of meeting time and space, participation in international institutions must
be controlled and allocated. The implicit principles of First Amendment liberalism
say little about which non-state groups should be allowed a place at the table, on what
terms, and with what preconditions. In privileging speech, these principles favor voice
and advocacy, so that the NGO (perhaps along with the corporation) is the model
actor in international civil society. Others with more distinctive claims, such as
indigenous peoples organizations exercising governmental power rather than simply
advocating or volunteering, are not thereby excluded, but their distinctive claims
receive no special status in a structure dominated by the NGO model.
Third, the hypothesis is consistent with the observable difficulties some of the
internationally influential NGOs have with regard to the roles of groups like
indigenous peoples that are ascriptive rather than voluntaristic.12 Whereas people join
and leave NGOs (or corporations), the membership of ascriptive groups for the most
part depends on birth, and members of the group who wish to detach themselves from
it may pay a steep price in terms of identity and access to resources and governance
structures. Further, whereas NGOs (or corporations) form and dissolve as occasion
demands, indigenous peoples claim an enduring identity and a responsibility to
ancestors and future generations to maintain this. A liberal commitment to
voluntarism and individual choice underpins a model of international civil society in
which voluntary NGOs (or corporations) are the paradigmatic actors, and nonvoluntaristic ascriptive groups do not find a well defined place. It is not First
Amendment principles themselves that produce this result. Rather, the liberalism
that has led to First Amendment principles being applied to international civil society
has also generated a model of a voluntaristic international civil society in which no
distinctive accommodation for ascriptive groups seems justified or necessary.
Adherents of First Amendment liberalism tend to take positions of the sort
encapsulated by Jeremy Waldron, in arguing that 'liberals are committed to a
conception of freedom and of respect for the capacities and the agency of individual
men and women, and.., these commitments generate a requirement that all aspects
of the social world should either be made acceptable or be capable of being made
acceptable to every last individual." 3 While liberal political theory has embraced

participation. See Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok.- The Costs of Mass Participationfor Deliberative
Agency Decisioninaking,92 Nw U L Rev 173 (1997).
12.

13.

See generally Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67
Notre Dame L Rev 615 (1992); and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton
1990).
Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights 36-37 (Cambridge 1993). As Waldron acknowledges, any such
generalization about a wide-ranging and complex set of positions is contestable and must admit of
exceptions.
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certain forms of NGOs (including civic associations and, with palpable misgivings,
corporations and industry associations) in which entry and exit are voluntary,14 it has
hesitated to embrace ascriptive intermediate groups.
Some indigenous organizations behave as NGOs and operate on the same
voluntaristic premises, in which case few issues arise. But other indigenous peoples
organizations may undertake governmental or governance activities that most NGOs
do not. In doing so they may privilege ascriptive characteristics (for example,
excluding children of mixed marriages from membership) and apply their own
cultural and political values (for instance, denying speaking rights to women) in ways
that many NGOs do not accept. They may argue that their representation of their
members is much more fundamental to the identity and welfare of the members and
of the group than is the representation claimed by NGOs, so that their participation
and decisionmaking roles should exceed those of NGOs. These positions are inimical
to the NGO model of international civil society and the voluntaristic precepts
generally used to structure participation under First Amendment principles.
III. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
SOCIETY
An adequate theory of international civil society must make space for indigenous
peoples and other ascriptive groups. For the reasons already noted, this is not possible
if liberal First Amendment principles remain the only widely accepted guide to future
practice in international civil society, and if NGOs and corporations remain the
archetypes of the available social roles within which other kinds of actors must
struggle to fit. Reflection on the case of indigenous peoples confirms that a richer
international constitutionalism is needed.
Practices of indigenous groups as organs of government or governance-for
example, their decisions to hunt whales or to apply gender-discriminatory
membership rules-attract opposition from environmental or human rights NGOs
who see the control of governmental abuse as a core mission. Such NGOs may
demand accountability of indigenous groups for their conduct, perhaps through
external intervention under rule-of-law principles. Illustrative of such liberal
apprehensions about indigenous governance is Justice White's dissent in Santa Clara
Pueblo v Martinez, in which he buttressed his argument for federal court review of the
tribal court's denial of a challenge to a gender-discriminatory tribal membership rule
by pointing out that "both legislative and judicial powers are vested in the same body,
14.

Pluralist conceptions of democracy as institutionalized competition to secure or influence the use of
governmental authority have emphasized the role of secondary non-governmental associations in the
democratic political system. See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory
(Chicago 1956). On the history of pluralist thought in England, see generally, Paul Q. Hirst, ed,
The PluralistTheory of the State (Routledge 1989).
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the Pueblo Council."5 He seemed implicitly to doubt that in small face-to-face
communities, such as Santa Clara pueblo, it would be possible for a tribal court
system to achieve the kind of liberal progress lauded by Edmund Burke, who asserted,
"[o]ne of the first motives to civil society, and which becomes one of its fundamental
rules, is, that no man shall be judge in his own cause."'6 Justice White envisaged the US
federal courts as providing a means for this liberal ideal to be achieved in tribal
communities, and quoted congressional testimony from a disgruntled member of
another pueblo demanding essentially this.
Indigenous groups, in turn, have plausible grounds to call NGOs to account, but
despite having some governance powers they may have few effective mechanisms to
pursue such accountability outside their own limited zones of jurisdiction. The
campaign against fur sealing is a reminder that the attractive freedom NGOs enjoy
under First Amendment liberalism can carry costs that may fall unfairly. Greenpeace
helped lead that campaign, but belatedly dropped it when the adverse effects on the
traditional cultures and livelihoods of indigenous hunting communities in the Arctic
region became evident. Large NGOs have increasingly adopted policies or internal
codes of practice relating to their dealings with indigenous groups, but these seldom
envisage any formal mechanisms of accountability or compensation.' 7 The contest
with regard to indigenous peoples' roles in international civil society involves familiar
tensions between traditional community and modern liberal individualism, between
particular cultural understandings and the assertion of universalizable values, and
between subsistence economy and the values of global markets. These are much
discussed elsewhere,' 8 and I will pass over them here in order to focus attention on a
less appreciated paradox relating to indigenous peoples' participation.
Claims made by indigenous peoples often depend, for their persuasiveness to the
dominant non-indigenous community, on the indigenous group being a traditional
one, the inheritor of a people previously wronged and which continues to be
recognizably distinct in culture and institutions. But the process of pursuing a claim
to land, compensation, or special status, and the structures that must be put in place
to manage assets and representation once such a claim succeeds, can result in the
transformation of the group's organization. The group becomes less recognizably the
traditional one whose "authenticity" in the estimation of decisionmakers and the wider

15.

Santa ClaraPueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49, 82 (1978).

16.

Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 150 (Penguin 1968) (Conor Cruise O'Brien, ed)
(emphasis in original).
See, for example, Marcus Colchester and Andrew Gray, Foreword in Proceedings from the Pocallpa
Conference, From Principles to Practice:Indigenous Peoples and Biodiversity Conservation in Latin America
(International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 1998).
See, for example, Alison Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village Indian Rights and International

17.

18.

Relations in Latin America 188-245 (Stanford 2000).
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public had been a predicate of the vitality of the claim. 9 This transformation is usually
toward the most successful organizational forms fostered in the law and practice of
modern secular liberal societies, principally NGOs or corporations.' These same
organizational forms are also favored in the construction of international civil society
and fostered by its practices, including its First Amendment liberal principles.
In parts of the US, Canada, New Zealand, and elsewhere, this process has
involved the adoption by indigenous groups of corporate structures, the management
styles and techniques of large businesses, and investment priorities focused on
maximizing rates of return. The corporatization of indigenous peoples has been a
primary objective of some state policy, as in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
of 1971 ("ANCSA"), a statute shaped more by concerns of the oil industry and
environmental groups than by those of native peoples.2' ANCSA required the
organization of Alaskan native peoples into village and regional corporations that
deliberately did not correspond to traditional governance structures. This has created
a new cadre of corporate-minded native leaders. Though some of the corporations
have operated successfully, others have struggled. For many people the legislation has
come at great cost to cultural continuity, collective resources, and the strength of
community. 22 Even where corporatization is not dictated, the adoption of corporate
forms is often facilitated by state attempts to channel indigenous organization into a
set of structures legible to the modernized bureaucratic state, as in the separation
envisaged in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 between the governmental
activities of Indian groups through tribal councils, and their commercial activities
conducted through Indian-controlled corporations. Some groups have responded by
using the corporate form for tribal economic activities but structuring the corporate
governance in ways that maintain control by the traditional leadership, as with some
New Mexico pueblos in which the board of the pueblo's economic development
corporation is virtually identical to the tribal council. But in other cases the corporate
management becomes a new source of power within the indigenous community. The
management methods of the corporation may incorporate elements of the
community's traditional culture, but often this may raise tensions with marketplace
views of best management practices. The indigenous group has strong incentives to
19.
20.

21.
22.

Comparable processes of transformation may also occur in other situations where the group has
substantial assets to manage and develop.
It is worth noting that indigenous peoples have adopted other organizational models in different
contexts, including religious structures, military organization, and political parties, but these are less
germane to the issues considered here.
On the politics of the drafting and passage of the statute, seeJohn R. Boyce and Mats A.N. Nilsson,
Interest Group Competition and The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 39 Nat Resources J 755 (1999).
For reviews see Thomas R Berger, Village Journey: Tle Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission
(Hill and Wang 1985); and Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Twenty Five Years of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act: Sef Determination or Destruction of the Heritage,Culture and Way of Life of Alaska's Native
Americans?, 12J Envir L & Litig 305 (1997).
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train more young people in corporate management, and even to try to adapt culture
and decisionmaking techniques to align better with the markets and regulatory
environment in which the group operates.
This dynamic is well illustrated by the experiences of the Ngai Tahu and Tainui
tribes in New Zealand, each of which received about $100 million (NZ$170m) in
settlement assets after the completion of claims negotiations with the New Zealand
government in the mid-1990s. Both formed corporations, but Ngai Tahu has
managed its assets strictly on market principles, with tremendous commercial success,
while Tainui, with a much larger population and more complicated and decentralized
governance structure, initially followed a hybrid approach which led to some notable
losses.' This has sparked a spirited debate about the compatibility of market-based
corporatism with Maori custom. Some Maori argue that corporatization and the
formation of other non-traditional organizations provides an external buffer to protect
traditional Maori ways of living and leadership inside, while generating the material
assets and self-confidence needed to revitalize dissipating traditional culture and bring
together communities that had become dispersed and disrupted. Corporatization has
intensified arguments for the construction of a Maori public law under which the
accountability of the managers of Maori corporations to the indigenous communities
may be greater than their standard accountability to shareholders under corporate
law, and may extend to the wider public, but would not be the same as the stringent
accountability for financial dealings imposed on state officials under national nonindigenous public law.
The paradox described above has many other iterations in the adaptations
indigenous groups are continuously making to the requirements of interactions with
states, corporations, NGOs, and international agencies. The strong demand of
indigenous peoples for self-determination, usually meaning more management of their
own affairs within the existing state, has prompted many states to devolve power to
indigenous organizations in specific fields, ranging from delivery of social services and
education to resource management and local government authority. State resources,
and resources from agencies such as the World Bank and Oxfam in developing
countries, have been made available to encourage the formation of indigenous
organizations and to build the capabilities of such organizations, often while
exercising a shaping effect on the kinds of organizations that are formed and
supported. Spurred in recent years by a local autonomy policy, over 15,000
indigenous organizations now exist in Bolivia. 24 Thousands of indigenous
23.

24.

Reports based on the 2000 financial year suggested that Tainui's assets were then worth NZ$170m,
while Ngai Tahu's had risen to NZ$366m. Kevin Taylor, Back to Square One for Tainui, New
Zealand Herald Gan 8, 2001).
World Bank, Project AppraisalDocument on a ProposedLearning and Innovation Credit in the Amount of

SDR 4.0 Million (US$5 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Boliviafor an Indigenous Peoples Development
Project,World Bank Report No 21345-BO at 5 (2001).
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organizations have come into existence in the self-determination era in Australia,
prompting one commentator to identify an "Indigenous Sector' that is
neither the 'state' (although it is almost entirely publicly funded), nor is it 'civil

society' (though the organisations are mostly private concerns in their legal status).
Rather, the Indigenous Sector is a third thing created out of the interactionsometimes, but not always, frictional-of government and the Indigenous domain.2
In New Zealand, organizations based on traditional Maori descent-based
(wbakapapa) groups are being augmented by large numbers of organizations catering
to non-descent based urban communities of interest, such as the Waipereira Trust in
Auckland, and Maori associations created for a particular purpose (kaupapa) such as
adult education or fisheries management. Distinctive bodies of public law are
emerging, with varying levels of indigenous input and control, regulating issues such as
the constitution of such groups, the mandate and powers of their leaders, ability to
commit the organization or to alienate group assets, responsibility to a voluntary
membership and to wider constituencies including the general public, financial
accounting requirements, structures of internal and external supervision, and dispute
settlement arrangements for intra-group, inter-group, and extra-group issues.2
This body of indigenous public law is generally incomplete, although it is
developing quickly in many societies. It may include principles of abstention under
which state institutions do not intervene in certain intra-indigenous disputes, without
including affirmative principles for the settlement of such conflicts. In some contexts,
relations between indigenous groups and the state are so bad, and the indigenous
communities so fragmented or operating in such difficult conditions, that neither state
nor indigenous sources generate an acceptable and applicable public law. Patchy and
fragmentary as it is, however, the internationalization of this body of indigenous
public law may provide some guidance on difficult questions facing international
institutions and for actors in international civil society. Which of several groups
represents a particular indigenous people with common genetic issues for the purpose
of giving consent to the activities of an international genetic research program? Who
is qualified to make or to waive a particular group's possible claim to the use of a
traditional design or an Internet domain name? Who is authorized to instruct a
human rights law NGO to bring transnational litigation on behalf of a particular
group? How should outsiders respond to external consequences of disputes within or
between indigenous communities, such as the Hopi-Navajo question in the US?
What does it mean to say the indigenous people have been adequately consulted

25.

Tim Rowse, Do Indigenous Australians Have a Choice? 6, paper presented at The Power of Knowledge, the

Resonance of Tradition-Indigenous Studies: Conference 2001, The Australian National University,

26.

Canberra,
Manning
Clark
Centre
(Sep
18-20,
2001),
available
online
at
<http://www.aiarsis.gov.au/rsrch/conf2OO1/PAPERS/B3-Tim_ROWSE.pdf>
(visited Mar 24,
2002).
Kirsty Gover and Natalie Baird, Identifying the Maori Treaty Partner,52 U Toronto LJ 39 (2002).
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about a new World Bank policy? What kinds of groups, if any, should be able to
infringe international environmental policies, such as the general moratorium on
whaling, without attracting protest from concerned NGOs? Should it be only people
engaged in "traditional" practices, for "subsistence" purposes, where whaling is of
continuing "cultural" importance? Or is it a right of a self-identified indigenous group
to be exercised as the group sees fit? In what circumstances would an indigenous
group have to explain what it has done, or assume liability for having done wrong?
Should international civil society institutions concerned with promoting
representative participation accept the pattern of the international indigenous
movement, in which many, but by no means all, of the individuals and groups most
active in the international movement are often not leaders of local communities or
significant actors in local indigenous group politics? 7 Or should they encourage a
pyramid representative structure through peak groups, or one directly connected to
grassroots organizations? Many of these questions pose problems of policy and
politics, but the difficulty international institutions and international civil society
organizations have in answering them is an indication of the need for an approach to
international civil society that extends beyond First Amendment liberalism.
Internationalized public law may be one useful, if limited, element in crafting such an
approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
International civil society in its widest sense is bound to be a largely unregulated
free-for-all, with markets in prestige, influence, membership, fundraising capability,
and other markers of organizational success. Where some regulation is required, as
with the allocation of space and speaking time in international institutions, NGOs
press their claims to participate on various grounds. Some purport to offer expertise
not otherwise available to the institution. Others claim to represent people affected
by the institution's activities, or people who have some other legitimate stake in the
proceedings. Some indigenous groups make comparable claims to participate as
experts or as representatives of individual stakeholders, but some make the quite
different claim that their participation is a matter of right because they are a
government of a people, not subsumable into a category of NGOs. Such claims may
be outside of, or even disruptive of, evolving principles for allocation of the scarce
opportunities for participation and influence that are constructed in dialogue between
NGOs and inter-state institutions.
A distinctive pattern of participation rules for indigenous groups has not been
generally established, but glimmerings are evident in the unique arrangements for
representatives of such groups to serve on the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous

27.

See Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village at 274 (cited in note 18).
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Issues,7 in the arrangements in the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations
and the Commission on Human Rights Inter-Sessional Working Group on the Draft

Declaration allowing for extensive participation by indigenous peoples organizations
not accredited under the United Nations Economic and Social Council system for
NGOs,2 and in the special status in the Arctic Council of certain umbrella indigenous
groups as "Permanent Participants" distinct from the category of NGOs. At present,
these arrangements remain more or less ad hoc, without general criteria for identifying
or distinguishing different types of indigenous groups, or for systematically

structuring any material distinctions between indigenous peoples and NGOs. They
offer no more than fragments of a general theory of indigenous participation,

representation, mandate, and accountability.
Problems of accountability are tied to wider issues of representation, roles,

legitimacy, sanctions, organic mechanisms for determining membership in an
organization and in international society institutions, and means to proceed in the face
of fundamental disagreement. Many of these issues take definite form only in relation

to particular international institutional structures, and to prevailing understandings of
the roles and agency of states. An internationalized public law approach provides
useful guidance in the growing number of concrete cases that go beyond ad hoc
questions of participation. But real purchase on these issues is only attainable through
the application to international civil society of a unified body of democratic theory to

supplant the existing implicit pattern of dependence on a limited analogue to First
Amendment liberalism. A body of practice within states suggests an increasingly rich
set of possibilities for reconciling democratic theory with the claims and needs of
indigenous peoples.' This may eventually spill over into the democratic theory

28.
29.

30.

United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution, Establishment of a Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues, UN Doc E/RES/2000/22 (2000).
See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32,
UN Doc E/CN4/RES/1995/32 at 15, setting forth in an annex procedures for "Participation of
Organizations of Indigenous People in the Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Working Group." Some
scope exists for states to oppose participation by indigenous groups based in their territories. This
power could conceivably be used in cases where the individuals or groups seeking to participate are
not representatives of the relevant peoples, but in practice such state action is unlikely except in
contentious political circumstances.
A sample of relevant work includes Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, and Will Sanders, eds, Political
Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge 2000); James Tully, Strange Multiplicity
(Cambridge 1995); Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims
Since the 1970s (Oxford 1997); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights (Clarendon 1995); Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada
(Toronto 2001); John Borrows, "Landed" Citizenship: Narratives of Aboriginal Political Participation, in
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Normans, eds, Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford 2000); Margaret
Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford 2001); Jacob Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford
2000).
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animating proponents of international civil society, although the process has a long
way to go.
In sum, a fully satisfactory theory of the roles and responsibilities of international
civil society actors is dependent on the development of broadly accepted and
operational principles of international constitutionalism. Such an international
constitutionalism must be pursued and promoted as a substitute for the ad hoc
approaches that presently prevail. One important criterion in assessing such theories
must be their ability cogently and robustly to meet the dynamic challenges posed by
ascriptive groups. The First Amendment liberalism that currently prevails is
insufficient to meet these challenges.
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